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Abstract 
 
The history of the Italian Communist Party in the 1960s and 1970s was marked by the 
party’s engagement with a succession of radical competitors. Following Sidney 
Tarrow, I argue that the party benefited from its engagement with the ‘cycle of 
contention’ which culminated in the Hot Autumn of 1969. However, a second cycle 
can also be identified, running from 1972 to 1979 and fuelled by ‘autonomist’ 
readings of Marxism. The paper contrasts the party’s constructive engagement with 
the first cycle of contention and its hostile engagement with this second group of 
movements. It identifies both ideological and conjunctural reasons for the Italian 
communist party’s failure to engage constructively with the second cycle of 
contention, situating this within the context of Enrico Berlinguer’s leadership of the 
party. Lastly, it argues that this hostile engagement was a major contributory factor to 
the suppression of the movements; the growth of ‘armed struggle’ groups; and the 
decline of the Italian communist party itself.  It is argued that the orientation of a 
‘gatekeeper’ party at a particular historical conjuncture may have far-reaching effects, 
both for the party itself and for society more broadly. 
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Closed systems and gatekeepers: the Italian case 
 
Sidney Tarrow’s model of the ‘protest cycle’ or ‘cycle of contention’, developed 
originally to describe the rise and fall of Italian radical movements in the late 1960s, 
identifies how new and challenging protest tactics can be absorbed into the political 
mainstream, even while the social movements which have given rise to these new 
tactics are denied legitimacy and marginalised. The cycle of contention, as Tarrow 
describes it, is driven by tactical innovation. A crucial concept here is the tactical 
‘repertoire’: ‘at once a structural and a cultural concept, involving not only what 
people do when they are engaged in conflict with others but what they know how to 
do and what others expect them to do.’ (Tarrow 1998: 30; emphasis in original) 
Different repertoires are thus available in different societies and periods. The 
interaction between challenging social movements and mainstream political forces is 
a key location of repertoire innovation. A cycle of contention begins with the spread 
of a new repertoire into different geographical and social areas. Existing organisations 
respond by adopting the new repertoire ‘in more diffuse and less militant form’. The 
cycle peaks with widespread diffusion and emulation, then declines as assimilation 
and neutralisation prevail. The end result is the demobilisation of the new movements 
and the adoption of most of the new repertoire by existing organisations; this in turn 
results in ‘a permanent expansion of the repertoire of democratic participation to 
include forms of action that were not present before’ (Tarrow 1989: 67). 
 
The model assumes that no new social movement can establish itself within the 
political sphere unaided, successfully claiming legitimacy for its own repertoire. In 
other words, a cycle of contention is only possible in the context of a relatively closed 
political system. The characteristics of political systems in which a cycle of 
contention is possible can be specified more precisely by reference to a typology of 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states. Kriesi suggess there is an inverse relationship between the 
‘output’ capacity of a state and the opportunities it offers for ‘input’. While a ‘strong’ 
state can both impose its will and resist pressure from below, in a weak and 
ineffectual state, ‘[f]ragmentation, lack of internal coordination, and lack of 
professionalisation multiply the points of access’ (Kriesi 1995: 171). Post-war Italy is 
clearly a poor example of a strong state in Kriesi’s terms. The first Italian republic 
was notorious for its kaleidoscopic sequence of short-lived governing coalitions: 
between the republic’s first general election in 1948 and the eruption of the 
Tangentopoli (Bribesville) scandal in 1993, Italy had forty-six governments. 
 
However, it can be doubted whether, in practice, the fragmentation and lack of 
professionalism of the post-war Italian governments did in fact create numerous 
points of access. These governments were built from a remarkably small and stable 
set of components, uniformly predicated on the occupation of power by the 
centre-right Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy; DC). Fifteen of the 
forty-six governments were DC-only; in the others the DC shared power with just 
four smaller parties, assorted over the years in ten different combinations. Democratic 
politics was largely subordinated to horsetrading among factions, personalities and 
personal factions within the DC and, to a lesser extent, within the smaller parties. 
Throughout the period, the opportunities for new political parties to grow and 
establish themselves, or for extra-institutional formations to put down roots within the 
parliamentary system, were small to non-existent. 
 
This experience suggests a four-way typology of state openness and strength, in terms 
of centres of power and points of access to the political system. We can distinguish 
between the ‘citadel’ model (Kriesi’s strong state), with a high concentration of power 
and few points of influence; the ‘network’ (Kriesi’s weak state) with diffused power 
and many points of influence; and two other possibilities: the ‘machine’, with 
concentrated power but many points of influence from below, and the ‘court’, whose 
multiple centres of power are all insulated against influence from below (see Table 1). 
  
Table 1: Types of state defined by concentration of power and points of access 
 
  Points of access to political system 
  Many Few 
 
 
Centres of 
power 
Many Network (‘weak state’) 
Multiple points of influence; 
no concentration of political 
power 
Court 
Multiple centres of political 
power; little accountability 
 Few Machine 
Concentrated political 
power, open to influence 
from below 
Citadel (‘strong state’) 
Concentrated and 
unaccountable political 
power 
 
The ‘democratic centralist’ structures adopted by communist parties and states are (at 
least in principle) an example of the ‘machine’ model, combining openness to 
influence with an unchallenged executive; similar claims have been advanced for the 
British parliamentary system. The political system of post-war Italy, by contrast, can 
be seen in terms of the oligarchic ‘court’ model, combining an autocracy’s closure to 
outside influence with the executive weakness of a polycentric system; Ginsborg 
notes ‘the archipelago nature of the DC state’ (Ginsborg 1990: 155). The Partito 
Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party; PCI) played an ambivalent role in this 
sytem; while excluded from governmental power, it figured as an eternal candidate 
for membership of the governmental elite, as well as exercising a degree of political 
power through affiliated unions and local government. 
 
This four-way typology specifies the conditions under which a cycle of contention 
may take place. Both the ‘network’ and the ‘machine’ state are in principle permeable 
from below, albeit (in the second case) permeable through officially approved 
channels. Monolithic ‘citadel’ states, by contrast, do not have the structural internal 
tensions which can be exacerbated by external contenders, and resolved by 
neutralising them. The kind of cycle of contention outlined by Tarrow, and the role of 
‘gatekeeper’, are characteristic primarily of ‘court’ states - where power is distributed, 
and to some extent contested, within a network of unaccountable centres. 
 
It is also worth stressing that the gatekeeper role has its own specificity, in that not 
every political party will have either the capacity or the motivation to adopt and 
absorb new and radical tactics. The gatekeeper role has as its function the stabilisation 
of the system by neutralising the threat posed by a disruptive external force; it is 
occupied by parties which are seen to occupy an extreme of the legitimate political 
spectrum. The threat may be neutralised by appropriating the contending force’s 
repertoire and claiming the loyalty of its supporters, in the inclusive model of the 
cycle of contention put forward by Tarrow. Alternatively, a gatekeeper may reject the 
contender outright and neutralise the threat it poses by reframing its repertoire and its 
membership as irredeemably beyond legitimation - as subversive, criminal or insane. 
 
The PCI as gatekeeper, 1966-77 
 
Between 1966 and 1979, the PCI played the ‘gatekeeper’ role in two successive 
cycles of contention. In the late 1960s, the PCI and its affiliated union the 
Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Lavoratori (General Italian Workers’ 
Confederation; CGIL) was confronted by a wave of innovative student activism, 
which fed into a wave of wildcat industrial action. Wildcat strikes were instigated by 
workerist activists, whose demands for workers’ power were encapsulated in slogans 
such as ‘More pay! Less work!’. Despite their less radical perspectives, the party and 
the CGIL took ownership of the strikes and delivered an agreed settlement. Some of 
the new tactics gained union endorsement, but over time most fell into disuse. 
 
As this first cycle of contention drew to a close with the decline of industrial action, 
the strikers had not only achieved many of their demands but succeeded in expanding 
the repertoire of legitimate protest tactics. Meanwhile the PCI had successfully held 
the balance between opening the party to innovative forms of activism and endorsing 
potentially uncontrollable sources of disruption. The fact that the outcome of the cycle 
was progressive, from the point of view of society at large, was the result of a 
constructive dialogue between a political actor - the PCI - and a movement outside the 
legitimate political sphere, in which the PCI played the key role. While never 
anything less than hostile to the social movement organisations which confronted it, 
the PCI proved capable in this period of delivering many of their objectives, 
appropriating most of their tactical repertoires and winning back their followers. 
 
Between 1972 and 1979, by contrast, the PCI was faced by a series of inter-related 
social movements organised primarily outside the workplace, and responded with 
dogged and uncomprehending resistance. The party denounced the new movements 
first as ‘adventurist’ extremists, then as provocateurs aiming to damage the left and 
finally as nihilistic hooligans bent on destruction for its own sake (The shifting 
‘frames’ applied by the party to the movements are detailed in Edwards (2009).) The 
party dismissed the movements’ new tactical repertoires as anarchic self-indulgence, 
vandalism and petty crime; the only hint at dialogue was a suggestion that the party 
would be prepared to deal with the membership of the movements, on condition that 
they first repudiated the movements’ leadership, their tactics and their ideology. 
 
The closure of this second cycle of contention was longer and more difficult. Activists 
of the second cycle had no successes which they could claim, and hence no incentive 
to withdraw with dignity. In the face of mounting repression (which itself was 
enthusiastically endorsed by the PCI), the choice was between admitting defeat and 
attempting to survive the clampdown through greater militarisation. The peak year for 
mass political activism in this period was 1977; it is striking that the peak year for 
small-group ‘armed struggle’ activity was 1978. The PCI’s refusal of dialogue - even 
the kind of hostile and opportunistic dialogue which had closed the first cycle of 
contention - led to the definitive exclusion of the movements from legitimate politics, 
which in turn encouraged a minority to engage in ‘armed struggle’ activism. Nor was 
the outcome positive for the PCI itself: far from expanding the range of legitimate 
protest tactics, the party constricted its own tactical and ideological range so as to 
minimise any overlap with the detested movements. This negative closure of a cycle 
of contention was, once again, very largely the result of choices made by the PCI. 
 
An ambivalent gatekeeper: the PCI, 1943-63 
 
The different choices made by the party in its role as gatekeeper to the political 
system should be set in the context of the party’s unusual and ambivalent history. In 
1943, the first year of the PCI’s existence under that name, the party had 
approximately 6,000 members. Thanks to an open-door recruitment policy and active 
involvement in the Italian resistance, party membership had grown to 400,000 by the 
end of 1944. Membership passed the 1,000,000 mark in 1945 and peaked in 1947 at a 
little over 2,250,000: around 5% of the entire population (Shore 1990: 34, Istituto 
Carlo Cattaneo 2005). After the liberation of the country, the PCI played a leading 
role in the post-war Constituent Assembly which drew up the constitution of the new 
Italian republic, and formed part of the first few post-war governments. 
 
The PCI thus succeeded in combining mass membership with a record of political 
involvement at the elite level, in a way which was highly unusual for western 
european communist parties. This can be related to the via italiana al socialismo 
(Italian road to socialism) elaborated by the party’s post-war leader Palmiro Togliatti. 
Togliatti proposed that a democratic government should be formed through an 
alliance of the PCI with progressive elements of the bourgeoisie, and should commit 
itself to ‘structural reforms’ (agrarian reform, nationalisation of the leading 
monopolies). The via italiana thus involved mobilising around intermediate goals, 
rather than either enlisting the working class in a perilous and divisive frontal struggle 
for socialism or proposing a reformed capitalist democracy as an end in itself. This 
process of continual and incremental mobilisation would enable communists to 
extend their presence within society; as well as serving as a bulwark against a revival 
of fascism, they would give democratic legitimacy - and renewed impetus - to a 
communist presence in government. The result would be a party which was 
‘institutionally pro-system - the champion of the new democratic republic - and yet 
anti-system - antagonistic to capitalism’ (Sassoon 2003: 41). 
 
Within the political system of post-war Italy, the PCI thus occupied a structurally 
ambivalent position. To the other main political parties, the party was (or aimed to be) 
a potential partner in a programme of democratic reform and constitutional renewal; 
to its members and potential members, it was the embodiment of a socialist 
alternative to capitalist democracy, which it expressed through propaganda, through 
collective celebrations and (most importantly) by organising workers in struggle. In 
Togliatti’s vision, these two visions could effectively be delegated to different parts of 
the party, which could work together in creative mutual tension. Communists in 
government could direct the base towards achievable and appropriate short-term 
goals; pressure from below, meanwhile, would ensure that reforms were integrated 
into a programme for social transformation, preventing a drift into reformism. 
 
Unfortunately the PCI was excluded from government in 1947, never to return; 
indeed, in later years attempts were frequently made to deprive the party of political 
legitimacy altogether, painting it as ‘anti-system’ (Sartori 1976). These conditions 
made the dual nature of the PCI problematic. On one hand, the party’s radical base 
was used to discredit it as a reformist force, opening it to accusations of duplicity and 
subversive tendencies. Ironically, these accusations were widely echoed - 
approvingly - by party members. In the period of mass membership growth, the 
pre-war hardcore membership, and even the substantial wartime party, had been 
vastly outnumbered by members who had their own understanding of communism. 
‘For them the communist party was the party of the Resistance, but they were also 
attracted to communism by the example of the Soviet Union in the war and by Stalin. 
... “Ha’ da veni’ Baffone” [“Big Moustaches is coming”] was the rallying cry of the 
southern workers’ (Sassoon 1981: 33). The party’s professed moderation was widely 
seen as a facade hiding cunning radical designs. Togliatti commented in 1946: 
 
‘Whenever we delve into the minds of our comrades, we find the strangest 
conception of what communism and our party should be, conceptions which 
are difficult to reconcile with our party line. Acceptance of this line is often 
superficial or formal, or is justified by the same stupid epithets as our 
opponents use regarding us (“tactics”, “trickery”, “secret plan” and so forth).’ 
(quoted in Sassoon 1981: 30). 
 
More sympathetically, veteran leftist Danilo Montaldi vividly evoked the survival of a 
shared, but unspoken, belief in revolution within the PCI in the 1950s: 
 
When in winter the labourers in the rail and coal yards, or the terrazzieri 
working in the fields, discover that they must spend the day out in the open, 
they seek out the nearest bar to procure a “sottovoce” [“undertone”] (a shot of 
grappa), so-called because the sale of alcohol is supposed to be prohibited 
before noon. Within the party, “sottovoce” has become the term which hints at 
that other possibility: the revolutionary seizure of power. 
(Montaldi 1971, quoted in Wright 1998) 
 
Montaldi likens the tacit survival of a shared vision of revolution to the comfort 
provided by a comradely bartender - and the PCI’s overt programme to regulations 
imposed on the workers by Italian capitalism. On this reading, the belief in a ‘hidden 
agenda’ arose not from party members’ perversity or stupidity, but from their belief 
that the party was inherently committed to revolution, so that its apparent adherence 
to a reformist programme must be a temporary adaptation to external pressure. 
 
This way of thinking, however, brings out the other danger of the party’s ambivalent 
position: that its overt commitment to reformist politics would effectively discredit 
the party as a radical force. Belief in the existence of a secret radical agenda tended to 
downgrade the importance of the PCI’s overt - and genuine - agenda, and hence to 
discourage party members from day-to-day activism. Thus in 1956, Togliatti attacked 
the ‘maximalist sectarianism’ which was ‘withdrawn within itself waiting for the 
“great day”’ (quoted in Sassoon 1981: 194). Of the Turin PCI federation in the early 
1960s, Amyot writes: ‘Having lost the perspective of an “X-hour”, [older members] 
had become discouraged and ceased to devote their energies to day-to-day struggles. 
... There were workers who were in favour of an eventual armed seizure of power, but 
refused to take part in strikes.’ (Amyot 1981: 123) 
 
The PCI’s exclusion from government was exacerbated in 1963 by the decision of the 
centre-left Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party; PSI) to join a 
government coalition as a junior partner to the DC. This was seen as marking the 
incorporation into the DC ‘system’ of a party with a significant claim to represent the 
left. On one hand this would broaden the DC’s appeal and reinforce its hold on 
power; on the other, it threatened to polarise Italian politics between the DC bloc and 
the communists, marginalising the latter. 
 
Berlinguer opens the gate... 
 
Togliatti died in 1964; his replacement as party leader, Resistance veteran Luigi 
Longo, was widely seen as a caretaker leader. The party was divided between right- 
and left-wing tendencies represented by Giorgio Amendola and Pietro Ingrao. Ingrao 
proposed that a cross-class alliance should be built on the basis of an appeal to 
left-wing PSI and DC voters, with the aim of implementing structural reforms to 
capitalism. This governmental alliance would be backed by ‘a network of centres of 
local power and direct democracy’ (Amyot 1981: 59), built by establishing bases in in 
local government and the trade unions. The goal was to build ‘a “new historic bloc” 
of social forces ... primarily in civil society rather than at the political level’ (Amyot 
1981: 61). By contrast, Amendola looked forward to ‘the communists’ entry into 
government as the only party capable of ensuring the success of a reform programme’ 
(Amyot 1981: 64). For Amendola, communist participation in government was 
necessary as well as sufficient for the survival of capitalist democracy: if the working 
class needed a left-wing alternative, so did the progressive bourgeoisie. 
 
While the Amendolan tendency was dominant, the Ingraian left remained a 
substantial tendency within the party, with significant implications for the party’s 
engagement with the first cycle of contention. The initial encounter was not 
encouraging. In 1968 the communist film-maker Pier Paolo Pasolini apostrophised 
radical students in a poem: ‘You have the faces of spoilt brats./Breeding will out./ ... 
when you were ﬁghting the cops/I was on the side of the cops!/Because the cops come 
from poor families.’ (quoted in Echaurren and Salaris 1999: 91) Amendola was 
similarly hostile, calling for ‘a struggle against the “extremist and anarchist positions 
that have appeared in the student movement”’ and ‘“revolutionary vigilance” because 
of the possibility of “provocateurs” in the movement.’ (Amyot 1981: 175). 
 
Amendola’s call for vigilance was countered by the young Ingraian Rossana 
Rossanda, who proposed to integrate the student movement into the Ingraian project 
of a new ‘historic bloc’: ‘the movements could create situations of “dual power” 
throughout society ... a new, non-Leninist type of party would be necessary, one that 
would not “direct” the mass movements, but would exercise “hegemony” over them’ 
(Amyot 1981: 176) The debate was resolved at the Twelfth PCI Congress in January 
1969, where Enrico Berlinguer displayed his aptitude for formulating positions which 
preserved party unity by combining left- and right-wing versions of PCI orthodoxy: 
‘Berlinguer proposed that the autonomy of the various mass movements be 
recognised. Furthermore, they were to be an integral part of the Party’s strategy for 
the conquest of power, as they formed part of the “historic bloc” the PCI was seeking 
to form ... in practice Berlinguer proposed to insert the new mass movements into the 
PCI’s struggle for a new parliamentary equilibrium’ (Amyot 1981: 177-8) 
 
Despite his conciliatory reference to the movement’s autonomy and his Ingraian use 
of the Gramscian phrase ‘historic bloc’, Berlinguer’s approach was essentially 
institutional. Berlinguer aligned himself explicitly with neither left nor right, aiming 
instead to unite the party around a version of the PCI right’s institutional approach, 
expressed in terms which evoked the Ingraian project for long-term social 
transformation. Nevertheless, the opening to the left was real enough to enable the 
party and the CGIL to swim with the tide of the movement, particularly once it had 
spread to the factories. PCI right-winger Giorgio Napolitano later wrote, 
 
In 1968 and 1969 the unions had serious difficulties and had to carry out a 
major effort at renewal, but they fully affirmed their leadership in shaping the 
struggles of 1969, precisely because they understood the lesson and the thrust 
which had come from the young people’s protest 
(Napolitano 1977: 36-7) 
 
Franco Berardi of the workerist group Potere Operaio described this learning 
experience less sympathetically: ‘again and again, autonomous organisations 
organised strikes in one section of a factory, after which the union came in, asked all 
the workers what their demand was, and used it to regain control of a struggle which 
had completely got out of their hands’ (quoted in Grandi 2003: 110). 
 
The strategy adopted by the PCI and CGIL was not simply one of opportunism, 
however. In order to offer leadership to the strikers and students, the party needed 
first of all to recognise them as part of its constituency - which meant, among other 
things, breaking with Pasolini’s insistence on being ‘on the side of the cops’. 
‘Extremist and anarchist positions’ needed to be redefined as class anger, and spoilt 
brats redefined as members of the working class. 
 
An example of this process of redefinition is furnished by a February 1969 news story 
from the PCI newspaper l’Unità. Students protesting against a state visit by the then 
US president Richard Nixon had been blockaded inside Rome University; attempts to 
break out were met with police charges. The centre-right Corriere della Sera wrote 
about the demonstration in terms of ‘urban guerrilla warfare’, ‘fierce hand-to-hand 
fighting with the men in uniform’, ‘a climate of near-revolutionary agitation’ 
(Madeo 1969). L’Unità’s correspondent saw the same events differently: 
 
the demonstrators demonstrated their determination to avoid a confrontation ... 
As the police charges continued, the young people blocked via della Panetteria 
and via dei Crociferi with cars. Some cars were burned out ... Again and again, 
the students made sorties from the besieged university; every time, they had to 
face police violence. In the evening, to protect themselves from the charges of 
police jeeps, the students blocked all the streets around the university with 
makeshift barriers; police charges took place throughout the area. 
(Marzullo 1969) 
 
What is particularly striking is not the fact that the two papers take different sides but 
the fact that each presents its preferred antagonist as peaceable, blaming the outbreak 
of violence - which both agree took place - on the other side. In the Corriere police 
acting under orders are faced with ‘hand-to-hand fighting’ and ‘urban guerrilla 
warfare’; in l’Unità demonstrators who are determined to avoid confrontation are 
subjected to gratuitous ‘police violence’, blockading streets with cars only in 
self-defence. This kind of partisanship on the PCI’s part was a necessity if the party 
was to assert leadership over the new movements, while maintaining its own 
self-image as a constitutional political party committed to the expansion of Italian 
democracy and the achievement of peaceable reform. 
 
A key focus for the CGIL, in terms of reform, was the 1969 industrial contract round, 
which would determine pay and conditions for the next three years. In December 
1969 a settlement was reached which reflected many of the strikers’ demands; it was 
accompanied by the passage of the Statuto dei Lavoratori (Workers’ Statute), 
enshrining workers’ and union rights in law, together with a retroactive amnesty for 
anyone convicted of offences related to the strike wave. When the Workers’ Statute 
became law in May 1970, numerous violent and disorderly acts ceased to have been 
crimes: a striking feat of retrospective redefinition, which can be seen to represent the 
high-water mark of the first wave. 
 
Subsequently, innovative and disruptive workplace activism continued and even 
spread, but took place with the approval of the CGIL. The union thus embraced 
innovative forms of action while rejecting the political perspectives which had 
accompanied them. In doing so, the CGIL was not only protecting its own interests 
but responding to its members’ demands. As the union re-established control, these 
demands in turn grew more moderate; even if union-centred activism was a 
comedown from the heights of 1969, after a point it was the only game in town. 
 
...and shuts it again 
 
In 1972 Longo resigned, to be replaced by Berlinguer. Berlinguer’s opening to the left 
had been real but temporary. In the unsettled period following the death of Togliatti, 
the new movements were a key point of reference for the left of the PCI and a 
potential destabilising factor for the party as a whole. Berlinguer’s centrism had 
aimed primarily to neutralise a potential threat to the coherence of the party, by 
integrating the movements’ potentially disruptive innovations into an overall 
institutional strategy. By presenting a version of communist orthodoxy which evoked 
the Ingraian left, Berlinguer gave the left and its positions qualified ‘orthodox’ 
endorsement; the effect was to make possible an imaginative and flexible engagement 
with the first cycle of contention, particularly on the part of the CGIL. Berlinguer’s 
position, resting in part on his appropriation of the language of Ingraian leftism, was 
further strengthened by the exclusion of Rossanda and other younger Ingraians from 
the party in October 1969, following the publication of an article critical of the Soviet 
Union in the recently-launched journal il manifesto. 
 
Once his position as secretary of the PCI was assured, however, Berlinguer could 
advance a new and distinctive strategy. In some key respects Berlinguer was a 
product of the Amendolan right, prioritising alliances over reform, deprecating 
industrial militancy and believing that the first goal of a communist presence in 
government would be to save capitalism from crisis. However, he was prepared to 
think the hitherto unthinkable, bypassing the secular left and centre to approach the 
DC directly. This was the strategy of compromesso storico (‘historic compromise’). 
In Berlinguer’s words, the goal was ‘collaboration between the great movements of 
the people: communist, socialist and Catholic’ (Amyot 1981: 202). Berlinguer’s 
proposal went far beyond the Ingraians’ openness to the Catholic left: Berlinguer 
appeared sympathetic to Christianity as such, which he believed shared with 
communism a critique of liberal individualism and an emphasis on social solidarity 
and discipline. In practical terms, Berlinguer proposed a government of national 
unity, progressing to a governing alliance with the DC which would ultimately be 
dominated by the PCI. ‘The days of [bourgeois] hegemony are over ... The historic 
compromise will provide the transition period to the new hegemony,’ Berlinguer’s 
ally Antonio Tatò argued in 1977 (Ruscoe 1982: 114-5). 
 
Meanwhile a new wave of contentious activism had begun: in 1972-3, groups 
organising under the banner of Autonomia (Autonomy) began to proliferate. The 
PCI’s response was obdurate. Wildcat industrial activism was dealt with severely. In 
1975 the Innocenti automotive factory outside Milan was threatened with closure by 
its owner, British Leyland. A march on the factory, attempting to mobilise workers 
after a union-sanctioned half-day strike, was rejected ideologically and physically: 
 
The workers’ response was firm: the strangers were thrown out at the gates. A 
little later all the workers of Innocenti Leyland met in a general assembly, 
restating their will to confirm their own priorities in struggle, rejecting all 
adventurism and all traps of provocateurs, calling for the withdrawal of union 
membership from the three workers who led the ‘attack’ on the factory 
(Anon. 1975) 
 
The following year a writer in the Corriere della Sera noted approvingly, ‘rigidly 
marshalled by the unions ... FIAT workers are ever less receptive to extreme 
suggestions.’ (Passanisi 1976) By now the focus of autonomist activism had already 
shifted outside the workplace: the tactic of autoriduzione (‘self-reduction’) of rent and 
utility bills was taken up in hundreds of thousands of households. Autonomists 
advised households to pay the industrial rate for electricity, 25% of the domestic rate; 
a popular slogan was ‘We’ll pay what Agnelli pays’, referring to the head of FIAT. 
The tactic was extended into what became known as spese proletarie (‘proletarian 
shopping’) in 1974, when a group of demonstrators in Milan forced a supermarket 
manager to cut prices (Wright 2002: 159). 
 
On occasion autoriduzione gave way to outright espropriazione (‘expropriation’). In 
September 1975, PCI-approved demonstrations against Franco’s Spain were followed 
by rioting in Rome, Naples and Turin. As well as clashing with the police, the 
autonomists smashed shop windows and looted goods. No less confrontational, the 
‘proletarian youth movement’ which emerged in 1976 applied the logic of 
autoriduzione to the costs of leisure, proclaiming il diritto di lusso (the right to 
luxury); groups withheld payment in restaurants and demanded cheap cinema tickets. 
 
All of this the PCI met with baffled hostility. The only significant attempt to 
appropriate the tactics of the new movement came from a few CGIL organisers who 
endorsed autoriduzione of electricity bills, albeit with a reduction of 50% rather than 
75% (Wright 2002: 158). However, this approach never received central CGIL or PCI 
approval. On the left, Rossanda mustered enough sympathy for the autonomists to 
dismiss them as confused teenagers: ‘I understand what has led many young people to 
break shop windows, but I don’t consider it a stage in the Italian revolution.’ 
(Monicelli 1978: 168). Duccio Trombadori’s anathema was more typical: ‘People 
who smash shop windows, like people who encourage attacks on the police ... must 
not be allowed a place in the ranks of popular and proletarian mass action.’ 
(Monicelli 1978: 56). Similarly, ‘proletarian shopping’ was met with unremitting 
opposition, which took physical as well as ideological form: l’Unità in 1974 praised 
the party members who had intervened in support of the shop manager at the Milan 
supermarket demonstration, which it denounced as a ‘disgraceful exhibition’ mounted 
by a ‘group of provocateurs’ (Anon. 1974). 
 
In 1976, the compromesso strategy bore equivocal fruit in the formation of a minority 
DC government, sustained by a pledge from the PCI not to move a vote of 
no confidence. Driven by the hope of entering government in earnest, the party 
leadership embraced the right-wing argument that the current economic crisis 
required cuts in wages and public spending, despite the fact that these costs would be 
borne by the party’s own constituency. In October 1976 Berlinguer called for a ‘war 
on waste’, specifically including ‘laxity in work and study’ (Berlinguer 1976); the 
following January Lama put forward a doctrine of ‘austerity’, renouncing ‘industrial 
platforms centred on salary’ (Anon. 1977a). Berlinguer put a hopeful spin on the 
theme of austerity later that month: ‘Austerity, by definition, means restrictions on 
certain availabilities to which we have become accustomed ... But we are deeply 
convinced that to replace certain habits of life with others that are more exacting and 
not extravagant, can lead not to a worsening in the quality of life, but to substantial 
improvement, to growth in the ‘humanity’ of life.’ (quoted in Sassoon 1978: 135) 
 
The situation came to a head in February 1977, in a direct and physical confrontation 
between the CGIL and the ‘movement of 1977’, a student-based movement which 
was the latest offshoot of the cycle. Addressing an unsympathetic audience in the 
occupied university of Rome, CGIL leader Luciano Lama called on the students to 
‘fight and defeat fascism, reactionary temptations, subversive provocations, every 
form of violence and every irrational temptation’ (Lama 1977) - a list clearly intended 
to include the occupation itself. Lama’s reception was rowdy; a group of 
self-proclaimed ‘Metropolitan Indians’ pelted Lama’s stewards with water-bombs, 
while chanting derisive slogans such as ‘More work! Less pay!’. As well as a 
mocking inversion of the old workerist slogan, this made an uncomfortably apt 
summing-up of the ‘austerity’ policies advocated by Lama and the PCI. 
 
The rioting which broke out at the close of Lama’s speech pitched students against 
CGIL stewards: a traumatic confrontation for both sides. For one participant in the 
occupation, the PCI was ‘an ideological father-figure - a father who should give you 
shelter but betrays you instead’ (Balestrini and Moroni 1997: 537). The PCI’s 
conclusions were, if anything, even more hostile: for both Lama and party leader 
Enrico Berlinguer, the autonomists represented fascism in a new guise (Tornabuoni 
1977, Berlinguer 1977). Party intellectual Alberto Asor Rosa took a more 
sophisticated view, arguing that the PCI faced an alliance of marginalised social 
groups organised against the working class: ‘their concern is to throw the 
“second society” into an attack on the “first” so as to disorganise and destroy it, 
because it’s precisely through this disorganisation and destruction that passing needs 
can be satisfied without waiting for tomorrow’ (Asor Rosa 1977). 
 
Either way, the movement could only be met with hostility, backed by strenuous 
efforts to dissociate the party from its tactics and methods. As recently as 1973, the 
Communist-run council in Bologna had introduced free bus travel during the morning 
and evening rush hours, an experiment hailed by l’Unità as ‘A major initiative by a 
democratic council’ (Anon. 1973). Now, however, any such action was ruled out, 
with autoriduzione criticised as inherently harmful to working-class unity: ‘Italian 
workers, as a whole, have shown that they are aware that forms of struggle such as the 
occupation of houses and “autoriduzione” ... display, in general terms, the 
characteristic of preventing mass participation by many of those whose interests are 
affected, gravely limiting the breadth of mobilisation’ (Fasola 1975). A leading 
member of the Turin party put it more bluntly in 1978, arguing that the party’s 
message should be: ‘Listen, comrades, some of the things (free rent, free transport) 
you are asking for are just stupid’ (Hellman 1988: 97) 
 
The exclusion called for by Trombadori was carried out literally as well as 
figuratively: PCI stewards policed demonstrations and repeatedly prevented 
autonomist groups from joining (Del Bello 1997: 309, 312, 316). However forceful its 
own actions, the party consistently presented itself as responding to violent 
provocation with resolution and discipline. In March 1977 a large group of PCI 
stewards charged a group of students in Turin (Novaro 1991: 171); the following day 
a meeting of the local party proclaimed its ‘commitment to avoid falling into the trap 
of violence, set ... by squads of fascist provocateurs’ (Anon. 1977b). This was not 
self-criticism: violence was associated with the student ‘provocateurs’, and to attempt 
to engage with them would be precisely to fall into their ‘trap’. By trying to clear the 
students off the street, the party had avoided that trap; the use of disciplined physical 
force had averted the possibility of violence. The students did not necessarily see it 
this way; some activists who later joined armed struggle groups recalled this incident 
as a defining moment in their disillusionment with the PCI (Novaro 1991: 152). 
 
While a few reacted to political exclusion by taking up arms, and many reacted with 
disillusion and disengagement, some responded more creatively. Many movement 
publications celebrated estraneità (extraneousness), a condition of cultural and 
political self-sufficiency and willed isolation from the mainstream. In 1975, the first 
issue of the journal A/traverso announced that ‘the movement has gone far beyond 
politics ... it’s situated in a dimension defined by radical extraneousness and refusal. 
It’s not concerned with struggling against this State ... even antagonistic direct action 
is a poor thing, compared to the richness that the subject in movement can develop’ 
(reprinted in Chaosmaleont 2001). Perhaps the ultimate expression of this outlook 
was the Metropolitan Indians, a group which flourished in 1977 and combined 
counter-cultural primitivism with unsparing mockery aimed at the PCI, the armed 
groups, the autonomists and anyone else who caught their attention. If the movements 
were extraneous to the political sphere, the Indians were extraneous to the 
movements; their main slogan was the defiantly meaningless syllable ‘Oask!’. 
 
A constructive engagement with the Metropolitan Indians was probably not possible, 
and in any case was not desired. The Metropolitan Indian phenomenon can be seen as 
an outstanding example of surrealist revolutionary ingenuity; it can also be judged 
symptomatically, as the sign of a social movement which had been denied any kind of 
dialogue with the political sphere, and as a result had turned in on itself. In other 
words, the emergence of the Indians, like the subsequent rise of the armed groups, can 
be seen as a pathological sign of a failed engagement. 
 
The PCI under Berlinguer was particularly ill-equipped to function as a gatekeeper 
towards any of the movements of the second cycle of contention, for two reasons. 
Firstly, we can reasonably view hostility to the radical left as the party’s default 
position and the earlier openness to the left as an anomaly. The PCI had always had a 
tendency to associate the political right with progressive cross-class alliances and the 
left with the hazards of disorderly activism. By 1972 the instability within the party 
which had made the movements of the first cycle a potential problem for the PCI, and 
hence allowed for the solution of a constructive engagement, no longer existed: 
Berlinguer’s leadership was broadly popular, while the exclusion of the il manifesto 
group greatly reduced the risk of a challenge from the left. In the absence of such 
countervailing conjunctural pressures, it was predictable that the party would be 
predisposed to hostility towards the movements of the second cycle 
 
Secondly, the unusual direction taken by the party under Berlinguer’s leadership 
made any kind of opening to the movements of the second cycle particularly difficult. 
Berlinguer’s argument that the working people of Italy should be happy to adopt an 
‘austere’ lifestyle was typical. Indeed, Berlinguer’s innovative (not to say quixotic) 
strategy of appealing to the shared moral foundations of the DC and PCI rested on a 
critique of individualism, libertarianism and materialism which ‘owed more to certain 
schools of Christian social thought than to either Marxist or even liberal democratic 
doctrine’ (Hellman 1988: 22). In contrast, the entrenched and defiant libertarianism 
which characterised the movements of the second cycle of contention was seen, at 
best, as a symptom of social dysfunction, as in Asor Rosa’s warning of the dangers 
posed by the ‘second society’. The party had ‘a deeply negative reaction to what it 
considered episodes of degeneration and social breakdown, which the compromesso 
would remedy by recomposing a system in crisis.’ (Hellman 1988: 218) 
 
Counting the cost of closure 
 
Instead of appropriating and absorbing the radicalism of the movements of this cycle, 
the PCI defined itself against them, shifting to the right so as to eliminate any 
common ground with the movements. The results were doubly disastrous. While the 
PCI succeeded amply in differentiating the party from the movements of the cycle, it 
did not profit from doing so. The structural ambivalence of the PCI’s position made 
this impossible: even as the DC exacted moderation and restraint as the price for any 
further progress towards power, the party’s base demanded that the leadership deliver 
results as the price for continued acquiescence. Eventually the party forced the issue, 
bringing down the DC minority government in 1979 with the slogan ‘Either in the 
government or in the opposition’; in the ensuing election the party’s vote fell by 4% 
relative to the previous general election. 1980 saw the party abandon the project of an 
alliance with the DC. Under Berlinguer’s leadership, however, the party remained 
committed to a conservative institutional strategy, now to be delivered through an 
even more unlikely alliance with the PSI. The party’s vote fell again in 1983 and 
again in 1987, the last national election it contested as a single party. The party’s 
membership, which had risen every year from 1968 to 1976, fell every year from 
1977 until its dissolution in 1991 (Istituto Carlo Cattaneo 2005). 
 
As for the movements of the second cycle, their marches and demonstrations were 
policed off the streets; their ‘social centres’ and meeting-places, dubbed covi (‘dens’) 
and associated with terrorism by a hostile press, were raided and closed down. 
Alongside widespread demobilisation and enforced inactivity, this had more severe 
consequences. Since 1972, ‘armed struggle’ groups had been a small but constant 
presence alongside the mass movements. Faced with uniform political hostility and 
near-military policing tactics, a small but significant proportion of movement activists 
now began to take the ‘armed struggle’ route; the result, between 1976 and 1978, was 
a marked shift from overt to covert activism (see Table 2). For most this experience 
was short-lived, as the effective suppression of the movement deprived the new armed 
groups of the hinterland they needed to survive. However, while these groups existed 
they exerted competitive pressure on longer-established groups such as the Brigate 
Rosse (Red Brigades; BR). The BR responded with more military organisation, 
greater professionalism and higher levels of violence - an apparently successful model 
which was briefly emulated by smaller groups (see Table 3). It is striking that it is 
only in 1980, with the overall level of armed actions far below the level of the 
previous three years, that the number of killings as a proportion of all armed actions 
rise above 5%. This is perhaps an example of ‘outbidding’ between rival armed 
groups (Tarrow 1989: 310; Edwards 2009: 186-7): a symptom of the closing phases 
of an exclusive engagement with a cycle of contention. 
 
Table 2: Mass events and armed actions, 1970-81 
 
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Mass events 257 330 269 176 257 333 282 277 190 103 33 81 
Armed actions 5 23 70 31 97 92 169 460 1110 802 258 141 
Armed as % 1.9 6.5 20.6 15.0 27.4 21.6 37.5 62.4 85.4 88.6 88.7 63.5 
 
Sources: Vinciguerra and Cipriani 1999, Progetto Memoria 1994 
 
Table 3: Killings by armed struggle groups, 1970-81 
  
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
BR  0 0 0 0 3 2 6 2 15 10 13 7 
Other groups 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 3 13 11 4 8 
Killings as % 0 4.3 0 0 4.1 3.3 4.7 1.1 2.5 2.6 6.6 10.6 
 
Source: Progetto Memoria 1994 
 
The costs of the PCI’s exclusive engagement with the movements of the second cycle 
of contention were huge. The exclusion and ultimate suppression of the movements of 
the cycle condemned Italy to the anni di piombo (‘years of lead’), the period of Italian 
history scarred by terrorist violence. As for the party itself, the resources for 
ideological and organisational renewal were squandered in the pursuit of a 
quixotically-conceived alliance with the DC and a narrowly ‘respectable’ image. 
 
Conclusion: political opportunities and how to miss them 
 
McAdam (1996) identifies four key components of the concept of political 
opportunity: 
 
1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system 
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that 
typically undergird a polity 
3. The presence or absence of elite allies 
4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression 
(McAdam 1996: 25) 
 
The Italian political system, throughout the period under review, was a ‘court’ system, 
with multiple centres of power all effectively closed to new entrants; the Italian state 
had a varying propensity for repression but ample capacity. The two key variables for 
present purposes are the second and third: the PCI in its capacity as a candidate 
member of the Italian elite played a crucial gatekeeper role, admitting the innovations 
of the first set of movements to the political sphere and excluding those of the second. 
 
This paper’s analysis of the factors underlying the PCI’s change of orientation also 
suggests that these two factors can be considered at a lower level, within the party 
itself. The instability of alignments within the party in the late 1960s, and the 
presence within the party of the left-wingers around il manifesto, made an opening to 
the left possible and desirable. In the absence of either, an exclusive engagement with 
the second cycle of contention was all too predictable. It was, nevertheless, an 
outcome which could have been avoided. The strategic direction set by Berlinguer, 
together with the tactical decisions made to establish his position within the party, 
were decisive in making the PCI’s constructive engagement with the first cycle 
possible. Unfortunately, the same factors were also decisive in committing the party 
to an exclusive engagement with the second cycle, with disastrous consequences. 
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